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Since the end of the cold war and the transition from a centrally-planned to 
market-oriented economic system, the Russian economy has undergone a staggering and 
incomplete economic transformation. International financial and technical assistance 
played a significant role in the evolution of the Russian economy. As the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) took a central role in the Russian transition process through the 
provision of technical and, more importantly, financial assistance, it was able to attach 
significant conditions to the use of its funds. These conditions ranged from the reform of 
markets, government revenues and expenditures, to the role of the public sector in the 
emerging market economy. An unanswered and increasingly important question is 
whether IMF conditionality has promoted or hindered economic reform and more 
importantly economic performance. This thesis argues that IMF conditionality combined 
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Figure 1.   IMF / Russia Cartoon. 
 
“Boris Yeltsin calling.  They’re having a telethon to keep Russia from returning to 
communism.” 
-Boston, Thursday, June 25, 1998.  


























In 1991, the Russian Federation set out to transform its centrally planned 
economy to a market based economy.  The transition, however, has not been a smooth or 
orderly process, with Russia experiencing significant declines in output, employment, 
and financial stability.1  In August 1998, Russia experienced a major economic and 
financial crisis that cast doubt on the transition process and on the prospects of the 
Russian economy.2  In this thesis we examine the period leading up to August 1998 to 
identify factors that may have contributed to the crisis.  To answer the question of 
responsibility, we focus on the policies of the Russian government; the role and 
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the impact of the 
combined policies on the Russian economy.  
 
A. RESEARCH SCOPE 
In this thesis, we examine the Russian government and IMF economic policies 
preceding and during the crisis of 1998.  We argue a priori that there is an important link 
between Russia’s transitional economic policies and IMF conditionality and that these 
policies were unsuccessful in preventing the crisis.  Research from leading economists, 
Russian reports on the crisis, and IMF documentation appear to support this argument.  
The combined economic policies of the Russian government and the IMF may have, in 
fact, caused the 1998 economic crisis.   
Curiously, even though these policies may have contributed to the 1998 crisis, 
they were continued after the crisis event.  The continuation of these policies further 
weakened Russia's economy leading to the hardships still experienced today.  A by-
product of these policies may be the increasing dependence of the Russian economy on 
the export of natural resources and the continued underdevelopment of the Russian 
industrial and service sector. This thesis provides an understanding of the players 
involved and the catalysts of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia.   
                                                 
1 Thomas E. Graham Jr., “Russia’s Decline and Uncertain Recovery,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (May 2002) www.ciaonet.org/book/grt01.html (November 3, 2002). 
2 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and others, “IMF Conditionality and Objections: The Russian Case,”  
International Studies Program Working Paper 00-3 (June 2000): 18. 
1 
If, as we argue in this thesis, domestic economic policies combined with IMF 
prescriptions to act as a catalyst for the 1998 crisis, the policy implications are stunning.  
The transition of the Russian economy may have been swifter and at a lower long-term 
cost by forgoing IMF financial aid and policy conditionality.  One may argue against 
continued assistance and conditionality to other developing countries based on this 
finding.  On the other hand, there is no explicit linkage between IMF aid and 
conditionality and the 1998 crisis, then the arguments against the role of the IMF in 
developing and transitional countries may be misplaced and warrant further evaluation. 
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II briefly reviews the research 
on the Russian economy. This section also provides a brief historical background of 
Russian economic development efforts prior to 1998. Chapter III focuses on IMF 
programs and conditionality. Chapter IV examines the Russian government's economic 
and political policies and relationship between the two in the emergence of the 1998 
economic crisis. Chapter VI concludes the examination of the economic crisis by 
revisiting the major arguments of culpability and final analysis of material presented. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
While the Soviet Union experienced a rapid rate of economic growth following 
World War II, the inefficiencies of the Soviet economic system began to slow economic 
growth in the 1970's.  By 1980, rampant corruption, inefficiency, and inequality 
characterized the then stagnant Soviet economy.  The collapse of the Soviet political 
system was soon followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the 
Russian economy.  As the Russian government struggled to stem the economic collapse, 
the International Monetary Fund assumed the role of direct provider of financial aid and 
technical assistance.3  From the start, relations between the Russian government and the 
IMF were nothing but contentious.  The unanswered question is whether the policies of 
the IMF and the Russian government contributed in a significant manner to the 1998 
financial crisis. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a review of the economic literature of 
the period preceding the Russian economic crisis of 1998. This thesis initially reviews the 
Russian economic development literature focusing on the economic environment of the 
1980s and 1990s. We then present a brief background of the Russian economic situation 
prior to 1998 discussing the government’s economic policies leading to the crisis, and the 
policies of the IMF.  We conclude by providing the basis for the following chapters, 
which will discuss whether the conditions required by the IMF and agreed to by the 
Russian government played a significant role in the 1998 economic crisis.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused economic and political turmoil around 
the world.  Many researchers have argued that IMF financial and technical assistance 
created the 1998 financial crisis while others note the influences of the global economic 
environment and Russian policy. This section synthesizes the debate over International 
Monetary Fund assistance to the Russian Federation.  This chapter provides 
the foundation for an in-depth look at the impact of IMF assistance and conditionality in 
subsequent chapters.  In the following sections, I discuss the timeline of the crisis.  
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A. TRANSITION PHASES 
1. Pre-Transition 
To understand the state of the Russian economy in 1998, I must first discuss the 
evolution of the Soviet economy over time.  The legacy of the decisions made in the pre-
transition period influenced the policy choices of the Russian Government prior to and 
during the 1998 crisis.  In this section, I examine the history of the Russian government 
beginning with the Soviet Union in the 1920’s; the economic policies of the Soviet Union 
up to the initial transition period in the late eighties; and the transition process through 
the pre-crisis period leading to the 1998 economic crisis.   
The Soviet Union pursued several different development strategies over the 
course of its existence.  At the time of the Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union was 
largely an agricultural society with little technology and a large illiterate population.  The 
Bolsheviks set out to modernize the state through large-scale industrialization under the 
guise of socialism.  By 1961, with the launching of the first man into space, the Soviet 
Union had been largely transformed into a modern industrial state.   
By the mid-1920's, the Soviet Union was growing, but debates began to arise on 
how to maintain the growth.  Government officials believed a shift of economic policy 
was needed. Joseph Stalin proposed the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 to industrialize the 
U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time while simultaneously making the USSR self-
sufficient by emphasizing heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods.  The plan set 
out to increase industrial production, and standards of living within five years.4  Soon 
after implementation, a lack of funding needed to meet the goals of the five-year plan 
resulted in its failure.  
In the 1930's, the government launched the second five-year plan, which 
expanded the first. This program was designed to overcome the deficiencies of the 
previous five-year plan, but replaced agriculture with an increased emphasis on industry 
and oil production.  Before the plan was fully realized, a new government structure was 
                                                 
3 The IMF was, by no means, the only provider of technical and financial assistance to the Government of the Russian 
Federation.  We argue, however, that the IMF had the greatest resources to offer and thus warranted a significant share 
of the attention that the Russian Government paid to these organizations. 
4 Eugene Zaleski, Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union, 1918-1932 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971) 75. 
4 
to be implemented: Stalinism.  Stalinism revolutionized the Soviet Union by using 
coercion to achieve the rapid industrialization lacking from the initial five-year plans. 
Throughout the forties and into the early fifties, the Soviet Union introduced three more 
economic plans. The fourth (1946–50) and the fifth (1951–55) five year plans had little 
impact on growth or productivity within the Soviet Union due largely to the lack of full 
implementation and social acceptance. 
The death of Stalin in 1953 ushered in a new era in Soviet history.  Soviet citizens 
began to gain a greater degree of personal freedom and civil security; and this helped 
boost the Soviet economy.5  Again new economic plans were introduced to stimulate the 
economy.  The sixth plan (1956–60) was discarded in 1957, primarily because it 
overcommitted available resources and could not be fulfilled. It was replaced by a Seven-
Year Plan (1959–65), which was to increase agricultural production, but also failed. The 
Seven-Year Plan was considered the start of a longer period devoted to the establishment 
of the material and technical basis of a Communist society.6 
During the 1970’s, the Soviet Union saw an economic boom with the increased 
spending to support the Cold War. 
From almost every point of view, economically and militarily, in absolute 
and in relative terms, the USSR under Brezhnev was much more powerful 
than it had been under Stalin.7  
Brezhnev believed that eventually, the West would experience a revolution and 
would ask for assistance from the socialist government. Soviet military strength ranked as 
a top priority for Brezhnev and dominated the economy of the Soviet Union.  During his 
leadership industrial production increased steadily but not as rapidly as Brezhnev would 
have desired.  To make up for a growing deficiency of technology, a number of major 
contracts were signed with Western firms to build factories and stores in the Soviet 
Union. Following the initiation of outside investments, world oil prices rose dramatically 
                                                 
5 Gur Ofer, Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985 (RAND/UCLA: Center for the Study of Soviet 
International Behavior,  May 1998) 12-16, 40-43. 
6 Gur Ofer, Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985 (RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet 
International Behavior,  May 1998) 46-52. 
7 Adam Bruno Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983) 39. 
5 
in 1973-1974 further assisting development of the Soviet economy. Unfortunately 
government corruption, inefficiency, and a rededication of funds towards military 
development, caused the economy to suffer.8 
In 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the country was in a situation 
of severe stagnation, with deep economic and political problems. Recognizing this, 
Gorbachev introduced a two-tiered policy of reform under the thirteenth five-year plan.  
On one level, he initiated a policy of glasnost9, while on the other level; he began a 
program of economic reform known as perestroika.10  With the plans of reform, he tried 
breathing new life into the stagnant Soviet system.11 There were, however, not enough 
funds though for training, equipment, research and development, or to keep the 
government operating, or to keep the citizens happy. Gorbachev's vision was to see the 
Soviet Union enter into the world economy with a hard currency, a strong economic base, 
and a limited market economy. He sought to achieve these goals through his policies both 
at home and abroad. All of these policies however, can be summed up in Gorbachev's 
‘New Thinking’, which spread its influence throughout the Soviet Union, Soviet 
satellites, and the rest of the world. This 'New Thinking' offered an entirely new attitude 
to Leninism-Marxism and all the policies upon which the Soviet Union had existed since 
the Revolution of 1917. Gorbachev introduced his new policies at the United Nations in 
December of 1988:  
…Human interests take precedence over the interests of any particular 
class; the world is becoming increasingly interdependent.12  
With his plan, he began the transition process of the Soviet Union.  In his June 26, 
1987 plenum report, Gorbachev stated: 
…The radical reform of the system of economic management is not a 
single  act  but  a  process  for  whose completion a certain amount of time 
                                                 
8 Christopher D. Barth  “The Decline and Death of the Soviet Union: 1970’s Détente through the Present,” 
Writings (December 1991) www.articwind.com/writings/sovunion.shtml (January 21, 2003). 
9 policy of open government. 
10 reform of the economic and political system. 
11 Robert L. Kellogg, “Modeling Soviet Modernization: An Economy in Transition,” Soviet Economy 4, 1.  
(1988): 37. 
12 Mikhail Gorbachev Speech to United Nations. December 1998. 
6 
will be needed…we must enter the 13th five-year plan with a new 
economic mechanism, although its development will continue even in the 
following five-year plan.13  
All of these changes required funding which was not available since growth had 
virtually ceased in the Soviet Union.14  It soon became apparent that transforming the 
socialist economy would be a formidable task due to a slow transition and limited 
economic and industrial resources necessary for such a transition. 
The government needed growth to quell the discontent of the Soviet 
population. The new economic and political openness created even greater 
economic inefficiency due to the double direction that these policies went. 
Some segments of the economy were freed; namely wages, while other 
segments of the economy were still being planned or regulated; namely 
prices.15  
 During the late 1980's, the Soviet Union began to implode due to a weak 
economy that could not produce enough food and consumer goods.  Perestroika failed as 
a policy of economic restructuring and glasnost served to highlight this and other failures.   
…The result of these incremental changes was to expose the vaunted 
stability of the communist regime for what it was; an artificial rigidity 
imposed from above and devoid of internal supports. What had been 
created by force could only be sustained by force; the price was national 
rigor mortis.16 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union began in the non-Russian areas on the 
periphery. Mass, organized dissent first appeared in the Baltic region, where, in 1987, the 
government of Estonia demanded autonomy. Lithuania and Latvia, the other two Baltic 
republics soon followed with similar demands for autonomy. The nationalist movements 
in the Baltics constituted a strong challenge to Gorbachev's policy of glasnost.  
                                                 
13 Pravda, second edition (June 26, 1987): 5-6. 
14 Donald Filtzer, “Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika: The Soviet Labour Process and 
Gorbachev’s Reforms, 1985-1991,”  Journal of European Studies (December 1995): 447-449. 
15 Kent Osband, “Economic Crisis in a Shortage Economy,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 100, 4 
(1992): 673 - 690. 
16 Christopher D. Barth, “The Decline and Death of the Soviet Union: 1970’s Détente through the 
Present,” Writings (December 1991) www.articwind.com/writings/sovunion.shtml. (January 21, 2003). 
 
7 
…The political crisis has two principal aspects; a vertical conflict within 
the Communist Party between conservative and democratic elements and a 
horizontal conflict between the central government and the governments 
of the union's 15 constituent republics.17 
Gorbachev did not want to crack down too severely on the participants in these 
movements; yet at the same time, it became increasingly evident that allowing them to 
run their course would spell disaster for the Soviet Union.  It was feared that tolerating 
these demands would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as other periphery 
republics would follow the Baltics in demanding autonomy.18 
As the economy continued to decline, greater political discontent and 
fractionalization within and outside of the Soviet government occurred. The discontent 
induced an even more dichotomous policy: trying to free the economy more and at the 
same time controlling it more. The Soviet economy continued to suffer from the 
command system. Finally the sinking economy produced enough discontent that the 
political system broke down.19   
Gorbachev's primary miscalculation was his quick transformation of the 
centralized economy. The transformation began without having the market system to 
replace it.  In mid 1989 politicians claimed they could bring the benefits of reform to the 
people faster and thereby gained great support among the people, signaling the downfall 
of the central government. The individual republics then no longer had any need to 
follow directives and orders from the central government in Moscow.20 
The economy in the Soviet Union, hobbled by corruption, inefficiency, and the 
lack of free markets, finally collapsed June 1990.  With the collapse of both the political 
and economic systems, the Soviet Union merely ceased to be and in its place arose Russia 
                                                 
17 Christopher D. Barth, “The Decline and Death of the Soviet Union: 1970’s Détente through the 
Present,” Writings (December 1991) www.articwind.com/writings/sovunion.shtml (January 21, 2003). 
18 www.bartleby.com/65/un/UnionSov.html (May 2, 2003). 
19 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 25-34. 
20 Alan Smith, Challenges for Russian Economic Reform. (The Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1995) 33-37. 
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and the other newly independent states.  Massive demonstrations in Moscow in August 
1991 over an attempted coup by hardliners were witness to the demise of the Soviet 
Union.21 
On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned and was succeeded by Boris 
Yeltsin. Replacing the former Soviet Union was the “Commonwealth of Independent 
Republics,” and was composed of most of the independent countries of the former Soviet 
Union. While the member countries had complete political independence, they were 
linked to other Commonwealth countries by economic, and, in some cases, military ties. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, instead of invigorating the Soviet Union, by removing the rigid 
controls that had kept the system together for decades, brought about its dissolution. His 
actions led to the end of the cold war between East and West, the sudden decline of the 
Soviet empire, and the virtual elimination of communism as a dominant influence in 
world affairs.   
When the Soviet Union, with its centralized political and economic system, 
ceased to exist, the fifteen newly formed independent countries, which emerged in the 
aftermath were faced with overwhelming tasks. They had to develop economies, and 
reorganize their political systems to ensure stability and success as independent states.  
Despite its many problems, Russia took bold steps were being taken toward 
democratization, reorganization, and rebuilding.   
What Gorbachev conceived as a social revolution to democratize socialism, 
empower the Soviet public, and improve the overall quality of life for Soviet citizens 
became instead a capitalist revolution, orchestrated by party-state officials to enrich 
themselves as a new elite under the ideals of a free market22.  Kellogg claims that while 
Gorbachev intended the reforms to strengthen the base of public support for a rejuvenated 
Soviet Union, but party-state officials promoted the demise of the Soviet Union as an 
immediate priority to realize their own personal and material goals.23 
                                                 
21 Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, “Russia and IMF,” International Affairs 75,I, 1999: 4. 
22 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 28-35. 
23 Robert L. Kellogg, “Modeling Soviet: An Economy in Transition,” Market Economy 4, 1, 1998: 55. 
9 
The problem with the Russian economy was stagnation.  The economy had not 
been made sufficient progress toward the market system.  While some parts were close to 
being market based, others were centrally controlled; a mixture that merely created chaos. 
Russian companies, especially those in the core manufacturing sectors, tried to protect 
their investments against the failing economy by transferring capital out of the country.24 
What resulted was a new type of economic system with its own rules of behavior and 
criteria for success and failure.25 
 
2. Initial Transition 
Following the Gorbachev era, Boris Yeltsin came to office promising economic 
reform.  In a speech to the Fifth Congress of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) People’s Deputies on October 28, 1991 he stated that economic reform would 
now begin for real by taking on the crucial aspect of price liberalization: “economic 
reform proposals which leave out price liberalization are so much empty talk.”26  Yeltsin 
planned to shake up Russia.  The painful reform policies he proposed aimed at rebuilding 
the economy starting with the basic standards of living and working up.   
In order to accomplish this, the first step was to rewrite the Soviet Constitution, 
which was drafted in 1977 under Brezhnev and based on the ideals of “all power to the 
Soviets.”  With a new constitution, Yeltsin could establish new rules and laws to support 
the recovery and strengthening of Russia.27  The Fourth Congress, however, denied the 
revisions to the constitution forcing Yeltsin to request special decree powers in March 
1993 for one year to jump start economic reform.28  Again the congress denied his 
request.  The congressional chairman Ruslan Khasbolatov, who declared that the people 
must be protected from mistaken reforms, led the coalition against the reforms.  Yeltsin’s 
                                                 
24 A. Abalkin and J. Whalley, ed., “The Problem of Capital Flight from Russia,” Centre for the Study of 
International Economic Relations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). 
25 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 63-75. 
26 Boris Yeltsin speech to the Fifth Congress of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) 
People’s Deputies on October 28, 1991. 
27 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 25-29. 
28 www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/chrono4.html (December 21, 2002). 
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response was to use the new freedom of the people to incite change stating: “let the 
people decide” the course to take.  This step led to a semi-democratic congress being 
elected.29   
With the new congress came a new constitution in 1993.30  While Yeltsin had 
gained the victory in the passing of a new constitution, it would take several years to gain 
acceptance.  The new constitution laid the groundwork for the recovery of the Russian  
 
3. Transition 
In 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia embarked on a program 
of drastic reforms to transform its economy to a market system.  With the end of 
communism, the Russian government followed the International Monetary Fund directed 
policy of “shock therapy”, that is, the liberalization of prices, trade, currency and capital 
controls.31 It was believed by the IMF that shock therapy would work for countries 
transforming to a market economy; the stronger the dose, the more quickly the change to 
be affected.32 Faced with economic turmoil, the Russian government requested financial 
and technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund.33  In accordance with 
established IMF policy, the provision of financial aid was tied to a series of policy 
conditions.   
Since 1991, a very small part of the Russian people have benefited from the move 
to capitalism.  Widespread poverty was common due to the partial transformation.  
Russia became according to Joel C. Moses a “presidential autocracy,”34 hardly different 
from the Soviet Communist era. Power was concentrated in the hands of a privileged 
                                                 
29 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 28. 
30 Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer, Russia’s Post-Communist Economy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 51. 
31 Alexei Izyumov,   “IMF in Russia: Who Else Will Crack the Whip?,” Christian Science Monitor Online 
August 10, 1998:  http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/1998/08/10/p11s1.htm (March 21, 2003). 
32 Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, “Russia and IMF,” International Affairs 75, I, 1999.  
33 Sergey M Rogoy,  “The Russian Crash of 1998,” Center for Naval Analyses 1998: 9 
34 Journal of Economic Literature, vol XXXVI. 
11 
elite.   The concentration of economic wealth and political power in the hands of a very 
small number of oligarchs directly resulted from this capitalist revolution.35 
One of the major steps in the transformation was Boris Yeltsin's privatization law 
promulgated in July 1992.36  Under the law, seventy percent of the state controlled 
enterprises would be privatized within three years.  The privatization of state-owned 
enterprises was riddled with problems.  A few elites were able to buy all the industries at 
a low cost and made huge profit.37  Joseph Stiglitz, former Vice President of the World 
Bank describes it as “…the rapid privatization imposed on Moscow by the IMF and the 
U.S. Treasury had allowed a small group of oligarchs to take control of the country’s 
assets.”38 Joel Hellman of the European Bank better describes the policy for 
Reconstruction and Development, as “winner takes all.”39   
 
Figure 2.   Capital Flight 
From: Schroder Salomon Smith Barney 
www.iet.ru/guest/Sundstrom/RussiaCapFlows.pdf (May 13, 2003). 
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The profits in turn were transferred out of the country leaving the economy and 
state with nothing.  This exodus of capital further weakened the already struggling 
economy.40  Additionally the gap between classes increased, resulting in a small elite and 
majority poor with almost no middle class.41 Widely acknowledged as an abysmal 
failure, Russia’s privatization increased corruption, crime, and inequality. “…Russia 
suffers not from too free a market, but from corruption…Russia’s tragedy is that 
reformers never had enough power to overrule these avaricious interests.”42   
Even with these problems, by 1996, the structure of Russian economy had shifted 
to the point that it more closely resembled that of a market economy than the previous 
socialist economy of the former Soviet Union.  With the decline in demand for defense 
goods, industry shifted its resources from heavy industry to consumer goods.   
Clifford S. Poirot, Jr. suggests the reforms that were implemented were largely 
cosmetic and were often undermined by “the proliferation of new financial institutions 
and instruments.”43  This was proved by the low quality of much of the goods 
manufactured in Russia.  Counter to Poirot's argument, Aslund states the Russian 
government made attempts to slow the financial decline.  The Russian government 
implemented price and exchange rate liberalization instituted a central bank and held 
democratic elections.  While these were positive steps, problems within the government 
led to implementation of improper financial policies prior to and during to the economic 
crisis of August of 1998.  It is possible the crisis may have been contained or avoided if 
the situation had been handled differently.44 
Anders Aslund offers another cause to Russia’s crisis.  His argument is counter to 
the “shock therapy” theory and instead offers the explanation that reforms were too slow 
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43 Clifford S. Poirot Jr., “ Financial integration under conditions of chaotic hysteresis: The Russian 
financial crisis of 1998,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics Vol 23, issue 3, (Spring 2002): 7. 
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and incomplete.  He does agree though that there was a problem with corruption in the 
government, which contributed to the slow, incomplete transition and eventually the 
economic crisis of 1998.45 
 
4.  Pre-Crisis 
Several authors and economists offer explanations to the causes of the 1998 
economic crisis.  One of the causes of the crisis was the Russian government’s failure to 
address the state's fiscal imbalances.  Due to a weak, inefficient, and corrupt tax service, 
the Russian government was unable to generate sufficient revenue to meet expenditure 
demands. The continuing process of economic transformation also hindered economic 
and financial stability. The inevitable result of IMF conditionalities was a dramatic drop 
in Russia’s standard of living and rising unemployment resulting in a weak governmental 
institution unable to meet the conditions imposed by the IMF.46 
On February 20, 1997, the Russian government considered a new tax code for the 
first time.  The idea behind the new code was to restore order to the tax system, which 
was overrun by corruption and tax evasion.  The restructuring would simplify the system 
by reducing the number of taxes from 200 to 30 while simultaneously eliminating 
loopholes plaguing the system.  The estimated loss of revenue from the ineffective tax 
system was estimated at 160 trillion rubles a year.47  Granville and Oppenheimer suggest 
the problems with the Russian tax structure and policies of the government were a result 
of the government frequently changing regulations and a burdensome system of 
compliance.  More importantly, the existing tax administration was notoriously 
inefficient; it was significantly larger than the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for a 
fraction of revenue collected.48  
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Despite the problems that existed during the transition, several economists hoped 
that Russia would prevail and would make the transition successful.  According to the 
New York Times, 1997 was the best in the whole decade for the Russian economy.  For 
the first time in several years, economic decline ceased and small growth actually 
occurred.49   With economic growth, Russia also experienced a decrease in the inflation 
rate, supporting the hopes for recovery.50   
 
5.  Russian Crisis 
The Russian government historically throughout the twentieth century followed a 
state-controlled economic policy giving market-oriented private enterprise a major role in 
economic development with limited government intervention.  Following the start of the 
transformation from communism to capitalism, the Russian government began to 
privatize key industries.  While it initially appeared that the government was fully 
committed to the transition process; it soon became apparent that some in the Russian 
government wished to retain tight control over the economy.  Regulatory and price 
controls combined with inefficient tax system, limited the extent to which the economy 
could develop over time by limiting growth and undermining the transformation to 
capitalism.51  
The transformation would end in 1998 when Russia found herself facing 
economic hardship.52 The most immediate and direct causes were the government’s 
financial imbalances and Russian fiscal policies that made Russia vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the global financial markets.53   In May 1998, Russia found itself in the midst 
of an economic crisis, which came to a head on August 17, 1998.  Investor confidence 
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rapidly declined leading to deterioration in overall economic conditions.54  The Russian 
crisis was a result of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998.  Following on the coattails 
of Asia, the rest of the world found itself in a global financial crisis created by unease in 
world financial markets and raising questions about the strength of the international 
financial system.55 The crisis hit especially hard in Russia due to its already weak and 
troubled economy created by the transition throughout much of the 1990’s.  
 
B. ROLE OF IMF IN THE CRISIS 
While the Russian government's miscalculations and corruption contributed to the 
economic crisis, the IMF's role in the crisis cannot be discounted.  As noted previously in 
this chapter, the IMF played a central role in the transition before 1998.  The IMF 
provided not only $11.2 billion in financial assistance but also numerous technical 
assistance missions and projects in support of the transformation of the Russian 
government and economy.  While there is significant disagreement on whether IMF 
assistance was beneficial to Russia, there is wide consensus that the IMF played a central 
role in the Russian economy prior to 1998. One problem was that the IMF had no more 
experience than any other organization in guiding states from communism to capitalism.  
Sanders wrote that the conditions in Russia are similar to those in Mexico, Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand.56   
Bernard Sanders describes the policies imposed on Russia by the IMF as “shock 
therapy,” essentially a Russian translation of the devastating “structural adjustment.”57 
The IMF mandated Russia cut government spending, sell off public assets, and raise 
interest rates to attract foreign investment. The IMF polices were overly restrictive in the 
wrong  areas  and  emphasized rigid fiscal and monetary targets.58  The IMF did not take  
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into account domestic conditions prior to imposing conditions.  These policies had 
proven to be ineffective in other IMF interventions but were still imposed on Russia 
leading to disaster. 
Illarionov states “The largest financial assistance package in the IMF history has 
failed in less than a month, international and domestic investors have borne multibillion 
losses, while Russia has fallen into one of the sharpest and deepest financial, economic 
and political crisis in history.59  
 
Figure 3.   Real GDP 1995-2001 
From: http://www.bof.fi/bofit/fin/6dp/abs/pdf/dp0302.pdf  (May 2, 2003) 
Following the transition, Russia's GDP fell 42 percent and industrial production 
fell 46 percent between 1992 and 1995 having a catastrophic effect on the Russian people 
and future stability.  According to Russian officials, real income plummeted 40 percent 
since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.60 A quarter of all Russians are living below the 
subsistence level and nearly one-third live below the poverty level. Three-quarters barely 
survive on an average income of $100 per month. The Red Cross calls conditions in 
Russia “a silent disaster,” reporting “We saw babies who were being fed powdered 
animal fodder because of lack of baby food.” The average life expectancy for men has 
declined by seven years, to 59, since 1990. One- quarter of Russia's labor force receives 
its wages late, in kind, or not at all.61  
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There is no evidence that IMF intervention does anything to prevent economic 
crisis in the long run. Instead, as Jeffrey Sachs points out, the IMF's track record indicates 
that it has become a veritable “Typhoid Mary,” spreading economic austerity and 
collapse to one country after another. According to Bernard Sanders “if the threat of a 
spreading global economic collapse is real - and I fear that it is - the evidence of the past 
year (1997-1998) indicates that current IMF policies are only helping spread the 
collapse.”62  
On July 13, 1998 the Managing Director of the International Monetary fund 
(IMF), Michael Camdessus said, “The IMF team currently in Moscow has reached an 
agreement with the Government of Russia on a major strengthening of Russian economic 
programs.”63 In the agreement between the two, Russia was to receive a 22.6 billion-
dollar bailout package to help it deal with its economic crisis. The Russian Government 
was to submit an economic plan to cope with the crisis, and show that it is being 
implemented. After four weeks, however, the ruble was devalued and reforms are not 
likely to be implemented. The Russian Government has failed to comply with the 
guidelines set by the IMF to receive full disbursement of the 22.6 billion dollars. The first 
installment of 4.8 billion dollars to Russia did nothing to bail out the mismanaged 
banking system, nor was it able to prevent the devaluation of the ruble.  
Joseph Stiglitz criticizes the IMF stating that it uses the same “cookie cutter” 
approach with all nations under a four-step program:  
• Step One is privatization. Stiglitz said that rather than objecting to the sell-
offs of state industries, politicians - use the World Bank's demands to 
silence local critics.   
• After privatization, Step Two is capital market liberalization. In theory this 
allows investment capital to flow in and out. As in Russia prior to 1998, 
capital flowed out instead of into the country. Stiglitz calls this the “hot 
money” cycle. Cash comes in for speculation in real estate and currency, 
and then flees at the first whiff of trouble. And when that happens, to 
seduce speculators into returning a nation's own capital funds, the IMF 
demands these nations raise interest rates to 30 percent, 50 percent and 80 
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percent. “The result was predictable,” said Stiglitz. Higher interest rates 
demolish property values, savage industrial production and drain national 
treasuries.64 
• Step Three: market-based pricing.   This leads, to what Joseph Stiglitz 
calls “the IMF riot”. The IMF riot is “When a nation is, down and out, [the 
IMF] squeezes the last drop of blood out of them. They turn up the heat 
until; finally, the whole cauldron blows up.”  According to Bernard 
Sanders “The IMF riots cause new flights of capital and government 
bankruptcies this economic arson has its bright side - for foreigners, who 
can then pick off remaining assets at fire sale prices.”65 
• Step Four: free trade. This is free trade with conditions. Joseph Stiglitz has 
two concerns about the IMF. First, he says, because the plans are devised 
in secrecy and driven by an absolutist ideology, never open for discourse 
or dissent, they “undermine democracy”. Second, they don't work.  
Under the guiding hand of IMF structural assistance, Africa's income dropped by 
23 percent. Did any nation avoid this fate? Yes, said Joseph Stiglitz, Botswana.  “They 
told the IMF to go packing.” Hallinan criticizes the IMF and their assistance by stating, 
“…no one should be surprised by any of this.  The IMF’s track record is one of unalloyed 
disaster.  It was the IMF that helped bankrupt Russia.”66 
The IMF has been giving money and advice to Russia for over ten years and they 
have yet to make any progress in creating a stable economy. In most cases there is 
evidence that seems to indicate that much of the IMF aid has gone to bail out corrupt 
government officials, bureaucrats, and connected businessmen, while average Russians 
lost much of their bank deposits. Several Russian Government officials have been quoted 
as saying that they “swindled” the IMF into giving them more money and stalling on 
making economic reforms. This leads us to believe that the Russian Government has lied 
to the IMF and in  doing  so,  hurt the Russian people. Reducing corruption is typically 
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considered a key element in accelerating economic reform but when the leaders of the 
government are the ones stealing from the poor and paying the rich, a serious overhaul is 
needed.67 
C. CONCLUSION 
Davies and Woods propose three possible positions as to the cause of the crisis: 
The first position suggested is one of “we lost Russia” or that the West was responsible 
for the failure of Russia due to lack of assistance.  The second view, and probably one of 
the most accepted outside the IMF, is that outside pressures forced the Russian 
government to adopt measures ill-suited to the conditions of the country.  The last 
position is that Russia brought about its own demise and that outside intervention did not 
help and could not have prevented the crisis.68  These positions will be examined 
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III. IMF PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944 by 44 countries 
with the primary purpose of promoting international monetary cooperation, exchange rate 
stability, and the expansion of international trade by acting as a lender of last resort when 
countries faced economic crisis.69  The IMF performs an important function in the global 
economy by attempting to make world trade less strenuous by providing support to 
nations in all stages of economic progress. In recent years the IMF has been the center of 
debate regarding its programs, advice and failure to help developing nations. This chapter 
is divided into two parts.  The first section will discuss the role of the IMF, its funding 
requirements (conditionalities), and the impact they have on developing nations. The 
second section will examine IMF assistance specifically to Russia and evaluate the crash 
from the IMF perspective. 
The debate over the role of IMF programs in recent economic crises including 
East Asia, Argentina and Russia have demonstrated the impact of IMF involvement in 
developing nations.  These countries turn to the IMF for financial assistance in times of 
crisis.  In return for the assistance, they must conform to the IMF articles of agreement, 
which require nations to undertake economic reforms proposed by the IMF.70  The 
reforms are designed to ensure quick economic recovery leading to stability and 
prosperity of the nation. 
B. ROLE OF THE IMF 
The international financial system has been radically altered since the 1920’s.  
This change is due in large part to the inception of the International Monetary Fund.  This 
section looks at the creation of the fund and its responsibilities as created by the founders. 
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The IMF was conceived during the Great Depression in the 1930’s.71  It was 
however, another decade before action was taken to officially develop the IMF.  In July 
1944 at Bretton Woods the IMF was established and began operations in Washington 
D.C. in May 1946.  Under the Bretton Woods agreement, the United States Dollar was 
tied to gold.  This created a universally fixed currency around the world.  The IMF was to 
ensure that the gold exchange standard was being followed as well as being the lender of 
temporary funds.  In order for this system to function properly three things had to happen.  
First, each nation had to define its currency to gold.  Second, each nation must then 
maintain a fixed relationship to its supply of money and its amount of actual gold.  Third, 
the on-hand gold must be allowed to be exchanged freely between any nations throughout 
the world.  With this in place, the exchange rates would be fixed to the gold standard and 
ultimately to each other.72     
During the initial years the IMF contributed little to world economic performance. 
“Initially its quotas were small and interpreted conditionally very friendly.  It also refused 
to make loans for reconstruction, which were seen as the providence of World Bank.  As 
a result there was little borrowing.”73  As the fund grew its determination to foster 
monetary cooperation led to the introduction of rules of behavior for countries.  The IMF 
established a primitive form of conditionality with rules regarding how much to lend and 
when it was to be repaid based on needs and ability of the country receiving the funds. 
 From 1948 through the next decade, several new and significant features surfaced 
in the international system.  During this period saw the development of new institutions 
for economic cooperation, dramatic growth in Europe, and U.S. foreign aid to the Third 
World.  These new programs helped to generate stability and prosperity in global 
markets. 
In 1971 as the International Monetary Fund had positioned itself as a world entity 
when United States President Richard Nixon announced a new policy suspending the link 
of gold to dollars.  This was the keystone of the international monetary system and the 
                                                 
71 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp (December 10, 2002). 
72 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp (December 10, 2002). 
22 
73 A. Winters, International Economics, 4th ed: 416. 
basis of IMF.  This announcement and the move to a floating international exchange rate 
for the U.S. Dollar forced the IMF to abandon its role of enforcing the gold standard and 
move towards its current role of providing advice, information and funding. 
In 1982 the IMF was thrust into the spotlight when it took on the role of assisting 
Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Central European states restructure their economies 
following the 1982 debt crisis.  While this was not the intended purpose of the IMF, the 
members sought to expand the role and influence of the Fund.  Following 1982 the IMF 
sought more ambitious role as an international lender to nations of the world.  The fund 
lent money during times of financial crisis in an attempt to return the world economy to 
equilibrium.  Since this shift in focus, the IMF has been under constant criticism. 
The IMF plays an important role in the world economy.  It has inherited a wide 
range of responsibilities including technical counseling and economic assistance to 
nations experiencing economic trouble, world economic stabilization and maintaining the 
health of the world economy.  According to Auty, the IMF rests upon three central 
premises:  rapid stabilization and tight inflation control; stabilization, which requires 
prompt realignment of internal and external prices with low fiscal deficits; and the pace 
of economic recovery is linked to the comprehensiveness of reform rather than to a 
recovery in the level of investment.74  Richard Auty concludes such price reform requires 
privatization and improved financial regulation.  The programs implemented by the IMF 
are aimed at accomplishing all these tasks as discussed in the following section. 
 
1. Programs 
The IMF over the years has established several programs to assist nations 
experiencing economic problems.  Evaluating the extent to which International Monetary 
Fund guided programs actually help countries they set out to assist tells us a great deal 
about the influence that international institutions have over markets, and whether an IMF 
endorsement is credible.  IMF resources are dispersed in response to problems and are to 
lead to a solution to the problem. 
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One justification that the IMF employs is that its programs serve as a signal of 
borrower credibility.  By signing a letter of intent and agreeing to implement it, the 
borrowing state sends a message to the outside world that it is about to adopt responsible 
economic policies. This claim has been used by the IMF as a rationale for conditionality 
and for making commitments more generally.75 Unfortunately, evidence in support of 
this 'catalytic' effect has been scant.76 The success or failure of Fund programs to 
generate catalytic effects has been alleged to be a source of noncompliance. Fund 
programs break down frequently because a state fails to keep its promises in the letter of 
intent. If we accept that signing a Fund agreement produces costs as well as benefits, and 
everything we know about reform supports this claim, then it could well be that 
politicians breach Fund commitments because the reforms promise results (in the form of 
foreign investment, aid, and additional private loans) that never materialize. 
In response to the Russian collapse, the IMF assembled a mammoth financial 
package—$17 billion for Thailand, $43 billion for Indonesia, and $57 billion for Korea—
whose disbursements were linked to the countries’ meeting a range of conditions that 
seem to go well beyond the fund’s mandate, and whose objectives reflect a troubling lack 
of institutional self-restraint.  
As Schadler notes, securing external financing to support adjustment programs is 
part of the Fund's strategy for addressing macroeconomic imbalances.77  Fund programs 
are designed with specific assumptions about how economic variables will behave 
months in advance. If an adjustment program operates with the assumption that 
additional external loans or foreign investment will come in as a result of the program, 
and these fail to materialize, then it makes meeting the other benchmarks of the program 
more difficult. As a recent review of Fund conditionality noted external flows failed to 
materialize as projected in a number of countries.78  If a country fails to secure additional 
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financing as needed to support IMF mandated programs, will cause problems including 
the inability to reduce deficits and reform thus necessitating further adjustment. 
Program involvement—the decision to sign a Fund letter of intent—is undertaken 
for very specific reasons. Because states seek Fund assistance only under certain 
conditions, this has important consequences for the study of conditionality. The proposal 
that an economic crisis may precede the decision to obtain assistance from the Fund may 
have independent effects on whether investors and lenders choose to lend to a country 
that signs a letter of intent. A second problem is that many studies of the catalytic effect 
assume that the program is fully implemented. This, unfortunately, is rarely the case. In 
making this assumption, these works overestimate the degree to which a state is actually 
“under” an IMF program.79 This measurement error attenuates the magnitude of the 
regression coefficients, making it appear like the program produces weak economic 
effects.80  Thus, for these two reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that the results of 
previous tests have been so limited. 
By approaching the IMF, a member country facing a financial crisis has access to 
the fund’s resources and advice. As a country’s loans become larger relative to its quotas, 
it must meet more exacting standards or “conditionalities”, which typically mean 
significant changes in economic policies to ensure that the country’s domestic and 
external deficits are drastically lowered or even eliminated.81  Failure to meet those 
conditions results in suspension, renegotiation, or even cancellation of the program.82 
So why are there so many conditionalities on funding?  The reason may lie in the 
sources of funding.  IMF funding is obtained through dues of member countries and 
returns on loans granted.  Today there are 182 IMF members who are eligible to take out 
loans from the Fund.  Membership requires a contribution to the Fund.  The size of the 
contribution is dependent upon the size of the member’s economy.  A member country 
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can draw up to twenty-five percent of its quota to address balance of payment deficits.  
To draw more than twenty-five percent requires a special agreement with the Fund.83 
 
2.  Conditionality 
Before we can proceed in understanding the effects of the IMF, we must look at 
the conditions imposed on assistance and funding by the International Monetary Fund. 
The IMF has panoply of lending programs designed to address the imbalance of a state's 
balance of payments, and overall financial stability. Studies of the conditions under 
which these arrangements are entered into demonstrate a consistent number of factors: 
low monetary reserves, high debt with large budget deficits, and high rates of inflation. 
Many countries try to counter these problems by producing more currency, which creates 
a rapid growth of the money supply and further inflation.84 
The conventional justification for Fund conditionality is that states lack 
credibility, and need to make a commitment to an external agent to bolster their resolve. 
Adam Przeworski argues: “Policy conditionality can be interpreted as a …penalty, as 
seen from the viewpoint of the borrower countries policy makers.  In this view 
governments accept conditions only when they need the IMF loans.”85 From the 
standpoint of a potential lender, this is not hard to understand.86 Reform produces costs 
as well as benefits, and because implementing it often involves alienating the 
constituencies that leaders depend on for support, committing to reform can prove 
difficult. Foreign observers know this: leaders can promise all the reform they want, but a 
lender's return is directly related to a leader's ability to implement reform.87 
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When a country requests assistance, an assessment is taken as to the needs of the 
country usually followed by the introduction of fiscal and monetary restructuring 
resulting in financial hardship for the country. This is because the Fund frames balance of 
payments problems resulting largely from domestic profligacy.88  To counter the 
economic hardship, country leaders produce more currency without advising the IMF. 
This action creates high inflation, which given the constraints of a fixed exchange rate 
imposed by the IMF, puts pressure on the national currency. To counter this problem, the 
IMF aims to alleviate the balance of payments constraint by providing monetary reserves 
in exchange for the state undertaking policies designed to reduce their deficit with fiscal 
and monetary restraints designed to devalue currency to improve exchange rates.89   
…to attain over the medium term, a viable payments position in a context 
of reasonable price and exchange rate stability, a sustainable level and 
growth rate of economic activity, and a liberal system of multilateral 
payments.90 
In addition to devaluation and fiscal reform, the IMF requires privatization of 
industry and the removal of export price supports and subsidies.  These steps, which have 
come to be known as “structural reforms” are implemented to strengthen the 
competitiveness and dependability of the economy.91 
Increasingly, the IMF seems to be targeting structural adjustment criteria rather 
than stabilization criteria. This seemed to be the case in Indonesia, for example, where 
the IMF program appeared to target the corrupt dealings of the Suharto regime by 
advocating increased transparency in government contracting. Yet experts in this field 
tend to agree that establishing a Western-style rule of law in Indonesia could take a 
generation or more. How then, could these structural adjustments have been considered 
effective for an economic stabilization program? 
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Unfortunately this is not what happens in most cases.  In fact the opposite is true 
in most circumstances.  The main reason for this is successful reform is never guaranteed 
causing reservations by potential investors. The implementation of IMF “structural 
reforms” can often prove politically costly by upsetting the populous for which 
politicians depend on for support during the transition.92  It is this counter effect, which 
complicates the reform process.  It cannot be viewed as a simple matter of developing a 
game plan and then implementing it.93  
Due to this lack of investor and states confidence in the reform process, it is not 
surprising that IMF programs fail. In fact, according to an IMF study of 59 programs 
signed between 1988 and 1991, IMF assistance was suspended in 35 cases, as the 
borrowing state failed to implement the policies outlined in the letter of intent.94  
Numerous authors have noted economic reform is politically problematic, and politicians 
have incentives to renege on their commitments.95 
The existence of uncertainty about whether reform can be sustained can serve to 
deter political leaders, investors and ultimately the IMF to offer additional loans.96  This 
creates a “double edge sword” in that uncertainty limits investment, which restricts fiscal 
policy, which ultimately causes in more uncertainty.  Ultimately the cycle leads to 
instability in the state causing the program and transition process to fail.  This is 
important because potential lenders and investors are concerned about rates of return, and 
if they think that reform backtracking will reduce their returns, they will not invest in 
these markets. Because Fund programs are often signed to tip the scales and use 
international leverage to bolster domestic reform, it is not always a given that the 
program will be successfully implemented. Thus, what might matter is not merely a 
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commitment to reform in terms of a signed letter of intent, but rather a good prior record 
of successful program implementation, which is difficult. 
It is these concerns that have prompted world protests regarding IMF programs.  
Their main argument is the continued expansion of the IMF's power and mandate is bad 
for debtor nations, for the global financial system, and, ultimately, for the IMF itself.  
They look at the funds history of economic disasters in states they have guaranteed 
assistance for support of their argument.97 The increasing scope of loan conditions 
implies that during a financial crisis, the fund should take over more and more of a 
country’s decision-making process, without any commensurate increase in accountability. 
Moreover, the IMF’s widening agenda has made it both less effective and more 
vulnerable to politicization, thus tarnishing the reputation that is essential to the 
credibility of the IMF.98 
 
3. Performance Criteria 
With the programs, conditionality and funding there is the problem of measuring 
compliance of nations with IMF prescribed policies.  The IMF uses performance criteria 
to monitor whether a members adjustment program is on track and if not, to encourage 
corrective actions be taken.  Measuring performance is difficult for many reasons 
including nations willingness or ability to supply data, inaccurate measuring techniques 
and a standard as to what factors to measure. 
…Every year, the IMF consults with each member country about its 
economic policies.  It dispatches a team of what Joseph Stiglitz, former 
World Bank chief economist, famously scorned as “second rate 
economists from first rate universities” to measure performance…99  
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Ultimately though it is the IMF, under undefined standards, that determines to 
what extent a country is in compliance.100   
Over the years with increased conditions placed on nations for IMF assistance, 
created a negative impact.  The additional requirements restrict nations from obtaining 
funds, or when they finally acquire assistance inevitably fail to meet all performance 
criteria as set by the IMF.101 
…The tendency in the 1980’s was to increase the number of performance 
criteria as adjustment programs had to be executed in an increasingly 
difficult policy environment.  From an average of below six per 
arrangement in the years 1968 – 1977, the number rose to about seven 
from 1974 to 1984, and to more than nine and a half from 1984-1987.102 
A major concern with performance criteria relates back to the IMF’s “cookie 
cutter” approach of assistance to nations.  If the IMF prescribes the same remedies for 
some or all nations, it must be assumed they are measuring success against the results of 
other nations.103  The problem of course being that all nations are different and have 
different timelines of compliance due to capabilities and degree of willingness to comply 
with IMF conditionalities.  According to Robert L. Borosage, Co-director of the 
Campaign for America’s Future: “For indebted developing countries, the IMF’s 
prescriptions are force-fed.  When the fund prescribes austerity, health budges are cut, 
children are forced to leave school, and workers are thrown out of work.”104 
Inevitably nations fail to comply with IMF conditions.  With the nations failure, 
access to IMF funds are restricted leading to a decrease in standards of living, and public 
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support for the transformation and the government.  The end result is a weakening of the 
political infrastructure, which is necessary to carry out the transition and carry out the 
IMF programs.105 
 
4. IMF Impact 
Critics including Bernard Sanders and Joseph Stiglitz have teen insisting reforms 
proposed by the IMF hurt developing countries.  Many view the IMF as an inferred loan 
guarantee but IMF programs may have the opposite effect: rather than act to attract 
foreign capital and investment, they deter it.  The problem of whether this guarantee 
helps nations credibility or encourages capital investment is the core of the difficulties 
with the IMF.  Another problem that shall be addressed is the assumption by the IMF that 
all programs are successfully completed. This section addresses these problems. 
Why proposed reforms have negative effects is not hard to understand. Potential 
lenders and investors understand the effects of past Fund programs, limiting their desire 
to risk financing which, over the short run, reduce their returns rather than increase them. 
Because of this, investors rarely commit additional resources after a letter of intent is 
signed. This creates problems in achieving financing for developing/ transitional 
countries under IMF guidance.  This problem is addressed in this section.  Additionally 
we look at the impact of both signing and keeping commitments on investment and loan 
guarantees from the IMF. 
Initially, an important question needs to be raised about the conditions under 
which international agreements are sought. States seek help from the Fund when they 
face balance of payments crises.  Because of the crisis, agreements are usually signed 
when states have no other viable options.  
Concerns over the effects of International Monetary Fund policies on developing 
countries have always been important. The primary concern is with the unintended 
consequences of Fund programs, more commonly referred to as moral hazard.106 The 
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debate over the Fund turns on the distributional consequences of Fund programs, namely, 
which bears the burden of adjustment, as well as the moral standing of conditional aid.107  
Another problem with IMF prescribed programs that is usually not addressed is 
the assumption that IMF directed policies are fully implemented, which is rarely the case. 
This complicates the ability to assess whether programs produce desired effects or not. 
This lack of compliance may have adverse consequences. By assuming that all programs 
are fully completed, the IMF does not have the proper tools for further assistance.  
Without completion of initial programs and solution of problems, the IMF’s policies on 
further funding are not sound.   
…the IMF has utterly failed to grasp the political impact of its actions.  In 
the name of free market orthodoxy, it usually attempts – in an almost 
academic manner – to remove all at once every weakness in the economic 
system of the afflicted country, regardless of whether these caused the 
crisis or not.  In the process it too often weakens the political structure and 
with it the precondition of meaningful reform.108 
The IMF acts as a somewhat “seal of approval” to foreign investors and lenders, 
particularly those with a positive track record.  Once a country implements programs, 
often they need additional capital to maintain positive transition.  The opposite happens 
though.  Upon entering an agreement and receiving initial assistance, flows of investment 
capital and loans decrease substantially.  This often leads to turbulence within a country, 
which compounds resulting in default of the agreement due to lack of funding.  So 
instead of assisting a country until completion of transition, they “hap hazzardly” assist 
usually causing failure.109 
One major problem though in determining the effectiveness of IMF programs is 
the misperceptions created by governments attempting to avoid responsibility. 
Governments conduct currency devaluation to encourage free markets while failing to 
restrict flows of capital across national borders.  These may undermine IMF 
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effectiveness.  While there may be some degree of blame for governments, such blame is 
dangerous for two reasons. First, it leads to government actions that worsen the crisis. 
Second, it leaves in place false impressions that make more likely the reemergence of 
another tragedy in Russia. 
The final conclusion is that by placing the responsibility of adjustment on debtor 
countries, the fund’s actions relieve any pressure on creditor countries to change the 
status quo or the increasingly ineffective regulation of international finance. 
Poverty is a critical factor in economic transformation that is too often overlooked 
to accomplish the bigger goals.  Some of the major causes of poverty are IMF prescribed 
“structural adjustment” policies.  The lending of money in exchange for cutting social 
expenditures decreases nations economic growth and development.  According to 
Thomas Friedman: “many are tied to opening their economies and being primarily 
commodity exporters, which, for poorer nations leads to a spiraling race to the bottom as 
each nation must compete against others.”110 
 
C. REASONS FOR THE CRISIS: IMF PERSPECTIVE 
A major problem and cause of the Russian crisis may have been in the banking 
sector.  The banking sector in Russia was consumed by corruption and inefficiency that 
led to trillions of Rubles in bad loans.  Because of this no amount of fiscal stimulus or 
monetary stimulus would have been able to stem the rapid deterioration of the Russian 
economy. The policies of the Russian government, which were the exact opposite of the 
free market principles created an economic disaster in Russia. 
Much of the problem according to the IMF is the false representation of the 
Russian economy by the government.  The failure of full disclosure of economic 
conditions led to a collapse of private investment and confidence in Russia.  So as a 
result, the attempts by Russia to restrict domestic demand and increase output requested 
by the IMF failed.  
                                                 
110 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (First Anchor Books, April 2000) 8-9. 
33 
The crucial factor though according the IMF was the global economy.  During the 
mid 1990’s, world markets entered a downward spiral and with globalization, emerging 
economies could benefit only at the expense of other emerging economies.  The most 
dramatic example was in August with the decision by Russia to devalue its currency and 
allow its debts to go into default. Today the loans to emerging markets are securitized and 
traded in open financial markets; a dramatic fall in their value must be reflected promptly 
in the balance sheets of banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investors. The losses 
associated with the Russian default totaled $100 billion.111 
Admittedly, global financial problems have exacerbated Russia’s problems. But 
the IMF suggestion to provide additional resources for the Brazilians to protect their 
currency again free market factors, which have judged that Brazil must devalue. Beyond 
that, many Brazilians are attempting to get funds out of the country in what amounts to a 
vote of no confidence in the government’s expedient policies leading up to the October 4 
election. 
The IMF in 1992 rushed to assemble a $22 billion package for Russia, supposedly 
conditional on the Russians suddenly discovering how to collect taxes to replace the $5–6 
billion per month that they had been borrowing from the global financial markets. When 
the initial $5 billion loan from the IMF was dispensed to Russia after July 13, Russian 
oligarchs, anxious to convert rubles into hard currency, immediately consumed it. The 
Russians then expected to receive more funds from the IMF by threatening devaluation 
and default. Even the IMF saw that further funds would simply be consumed by the same 
clique moving funds out of Russia, and the Russians unilaterally devalued and 
defaulted.112  
The Russian episode is hardly an example of free market operation and free and 
unfettered flows of capital. The IMF essentially expropriated resources provided by 
industrial countries and irresponsibly allocated those funds to a country that had 
absolutely no hope of meeting the conditions allegedly attached to the IMF program. 
Russian technocrats such as Anatoly Chubais openly chortled to the Russian press that 
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they had “conned” the IMF and its chief negotiator, Stanley Fischer. The Russian 
episode, not to mention the IMF performance in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, 
reflects the actions of people who face no accountability for their performance. If the 
IMF managing director and deputy managing director had been managing funds in the 
private sector in the same way, they would have long ago been bankrupt and forced out 
of business.  
Although less-developed countries such as those in Asia undoubtedly need to 
open up to the world’s capital markets, they would be well advised to do so at a pace 
commensurate with their capacity to develop sound regulatory and institutional 
structures. In particular, tighter limits on short-term foreign borrowing, especially by 
banks, may well be essential.  The lesson that should have been learned from Indonesia 
should be that instruments must be matched to objectives, including the time frame 
envisioned for the objectives to be achieved. Unfortunately, IMF staff had not absorbed 
this lesson by the time the last IMF loan to Russia was approved last summer. The record 
of the Russian debacle is as follows. 
In the first two weeks of August 1998 it was already clear that Russian central 
banking authorities could not prevent a collapse of the ruble. And this was just weeks into 
a $4.8 billion IMF program, part of a $22.6 billion package of loans whose main goal was 
to support the ruble, come what may. On August 17 the Russian government devalued the 
ruble and, in a potentially more damaging move, mandated a general default on Russian 
debt.113 
                                                 




Figure 4.   Consumer prices, nominal and real exchange rate 
from: International Financial Statistics. November 1999. http://www.ecaar-
russia.org/nekipelov.htm (May 13, 2003). 
 
The central bank Governor at the time, Sergei Dubinin, disclosed that from July 
20 until the ruble’s collapse, the central bank had actually spent up to $3.8 billion to 
defend the currency, while the Finance Ministry had used $1 billion to redeem short-term 
government debt. The IMF loan was depleted immediately as the Russians tried to prop 
up the ruble by spending more than $1 billion a week. But there’s more. Former Deputy 
Prime Minister Nemtsov alleged that during this period he tried to get the prime minister 
to consider devaluation, only to be told that this was impossible. Why? “Because the IMF 
opposed it,” said Kiryenko, according to Nemtsov, who revealed this, after President 
Yeltsin fired the entire government.114 
Russia had achieved a false stability with its oil exports, in combination with the 
nonpayment of government wages and pensions, to compensate for its failure to collect 
taxes. But when the price of oil fell by half, its oil income dropped. When an unforeseen 
income shock like this occurs the response should be to reduce the price of one’s exports 
and increase the price of imports to regain stability. The way to do this is to let the 
currency depreciate, withstand the upward adjustment of import prices that will follow by 
standing fast against increased wage demands and pleas for more subsidies, and just ride 
it out. 
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IMF loans are supposed to help a country ride out the stabilization period by 
providing the foreign exchange it needs for essential imports until the depreciation causes 
exports to pick up. It is true that depreciation makes it harder for the country to repay its 
foreign loans until its exports have recovered. But that is also what IMF loans are 
supposed to help with, by providing short-term liquidity to finance the increased cost of 
servicing foreign debts until export revenues pick up. 
Instead, somehow IMF staff was persuaded to tie short-term stabilization goals to 
commitments to implement medium-term structural adjustment measures. With oil and 
gas revenues having severely declined, and with the government having already 
borrowed well beyond its capacity, immediate reform of the tax system, including reform 
of the tax collection institutions, became a prerequisite for the success of the IMF-
supported stabilization program. 
Moral hazard or the propensity in both borrowing countries and their creditors to 
take excessive risks because of the implicit insurance offered by bailouts—applies to the 
IMF as well as to borrowers and creditors. The steady expansion of institutional 
objectives has occurred because borrowing countries bear a disproportionate share of the 
political, economic, and financial risks of IMF programs. There is little downside to these 
programs for the fund’s major shareholders, its management, or its staff. The damage 
resulting from the IMF’s mishandling of the Indonesian banking sector, for example, was 
borne entirely by Indonesia, not by the IMF or the board that signed onto these 
conditions. 
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to bring to light implications for the effects of 
Fund programs.  First, the evidence demonstrates that Fund sanctions can be costly. This 
is somewhat surprising, since the conventional wisdom is that states can return to the 
Fund with their past sins of program noncompliance forgiven and receive fresh loans. In 
the Public Choice approach to international institutions, the Fund is a budget-maximizing 
bureaucracy that values lending over policy reform. To derive from this that 
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noncompliance is costless, however, is a misnomer, since as the conditional coefficient 
suggests, all types of flows drop off in the wake of a program suspension. 115 
This evidence stands in contrast to our conventional understanding of 
international institutions. The evidence here suggests that the opposite is the case; Fund 
sanctions are costly to the extent that they deter additional flows of loans and 
investments. While these countries made mistakes, their economies were undermined by 
the impact of the global market and capital flows that the IMF sought to set free. 
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IV. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
The Soviet Union since its inception has seen tremendous shifts in its economy.  
As discussed earlier, the leaders of the Soviet Union attempted to stem the economic 
turbulence though thirteen separate five-year plans.116  This chapter will demonstrate the 
attempts by the Russian government to produce a strong, stable economy were superficial 
and failed to address the real issues resulting in economic hardship.  The result was the 
1998 Russian economic crisis.  This chapter will look at the conditions that existed and 
the Russian view of IMF assistance to determine the cause of the 1998 crisis. 
At the IMF's urging, Russia rapidly dismantled its pre-existing economic system 
by abolishing central planning, eliminating controls on imports and capital flight, and 
privatizing most state enterprises. A new and effective capitalist market system was 
supposed to appear rapidly through individual initiative.  But in the modern world 
building a capitalist system requires an active state role and a considerable period of time. 
With its old economic system dismantled and no new one to take its place, the Russian 
economy descended into chaos.  
 
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S ECONOMIC POLICIES 
The Russian government’s economic policies significantly contributed to the 
1998 Russian economic crisis. The policies were intended to transform the Russian 
economy from a socialist driven into an export-oriented, private-sector-driven economy.  
Initially the government was heavily dependent on oil sales to fund the transformation 
and support the policies mandated by the IMF.  Unfortunately as the political competition 
began to increase after the 1991 coup, the government strayed from fully implementing 
their original reform program and instead pursued policies popular with the people, in an 
effort to quell the uproars.  This move proved to be economically devastating. The 
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Russian economy was already in bad condition with a high public deficit and inflation 
rates only to be worsened by the failures to address underlying causes of the problems.117  
The IMF’s insistence on reform further hurt any chances at recovery and 
restricted the implementation of any possible solutions the Russian government may have 
had.  In this economic context, the government made significant policy changes regarding 
its debt financing methods during the second half of 1993, which, in return, triggered an 
outflow of capital into foreign exchanges and started an economic crisis. 
 
1. Banking Sector 
For more than 20 years, the IMF has provided loans to debt-plagued and cash-
strapped poor countries.  The funds came in exchange for their implementation of far-
reaching policies designed to encourage foreign investment and rapid economic 
growth.118  Following IMF insistence, Russia’s economic output fell by half and its 
investment by three fourths.119   As a result, money became so scarce that half of all 
transactions were conducted through barter creating a virtual economy.120  
 
Figure 5.   Barter Trade and Inflation 
from: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~res2000/papers/pdffiles/Gara.pdf (May 1, 2002) 
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On the back of this, Russian elites and government officials got richer as the stock 
market soared on oil.  Western banks helped to finance the buying of government owned 
industries that drove up Russian stock prices, making it one to the world’s best-
performing stock markets.121 
Among other policies, the IMF requires countries to reduce tariffs and other 
import barriers, increase exports, reduce government budgets and subsidies, privatize 
state enterprises, and provide tax and other incentives for foreign investment.  According 
to Strobe Talbott, Russia experienced “too much shock and too little therapy” in its 
transformation.122  The IMF insisted upon rapid privatization of government-controlled 
businesses, which allowed a small group of oligarchs to gain control of state assets. The 
IMF paid insufficient attention to the institutional infrastructure that would allow a 
market economy to flourish and by easing the flow of capital in and out of Russia; the 
IMF had laid the groundwork for the oligarchs’ plundering.  Due to this short 
sightedness, the Russian economy continued to fail throughout the 1990’s resulting in 
falling output levels and population. Through the mid-90’s the Russian economy 
continued to implode.  Output plummeted by half.  While only two percent of the 
population had lived in poverty at the end of the Soviet period, the IMF reform saw 
poverty rates increase to almost 50 percent.123 
Programs are ultimately directed towards achieving the highest possible 
growth, which is not necessarily the same as achieving the highest 
possible poverty reduction.124 
These policies tended to hurt the interests of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of 
the borrowing countries, which was evident in Russia.125  
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B. IMF ASSISTANCE 
As discussed earlier, the Russian government made several attempts at creating a 
strong market economy.  Many of these attempts failed or produced marginal 
improvements primarily due to a lack of understanding of the effects of free market 
principles.  This is a key point in understanding the crisis of 1998.  The volatility of the 
political environment in Russia had a crucial effect on the government’s ability to 
implement stable economic policies. The government could not implement the necessary 
fiscal measures to decrease the public deficit and improve its fiscal situation.  The 
government responded to these events by depleting foreign exchange reserves and by 
borrowing abroad instead of restraining expenditures and increasing revenues. 
Towards the end of 1992, Russia experienced significant decreases in the 
manufacturing sector due to the inability of owners to adjust to capitalist ways.  For 
years, the government controlled costs, production and to an extent employment.  When 
the economy was thrust on to the global market, owners had no idea how to purchase raw 
materials or sell products competitively on world markets. This resulted in a decline in 
industrial production, exacerbating the recession.  Following this, the government set out 
to obtain the confidence of international creditors, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
in its determination to implement structural reforms to overcome its major economic 
problems with the stabilization program.126 The government succeeded in this goal and 
signed an agreement with the IMF in April 1992 for 24 Billion Dollars.127  Unfortunately 
however, political problems obstructed the implementation of the economic stabilization 
program and IMF stand-by agreement measures. 
The IMF failed to recognize that Russia and Russians were a world unto 
themselves.  Even more to the point, “perhaps the one view that the Russian privateers 
shared most strongly was that the Russian people, like the rest of the world, were 
economic men, who rationally responded to incentives.128 Bernard Sanders seems to 
summarize the issue of Russia in his statement to Congress where he said: 
                                                 
126 Anders Aslund, “Russia’s Collapse” Foreign Affairs  Vol. 79, Issue 5 (Sept/Oct 1999): 64-77. 
127 http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/chron4.html (December 21, 2002). 
42 
128 Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambiridge: MIT Press, 
1995) vii. 
…And then the meltdown in Russia began. Poor Russia.  It is incredible 
that a great country with such a tragic history has got to suffer again. 
When communism fell in 1991, the Russian government received the 
attention and the guidance of the IMF and all of their brilliant policy 
advisors, and tragically the Russian government listened to them and took 
their advice.  It is fair to argue that never before in modern history has a 
major industrialized nation experienced the kind of decline in a seven –
year period as Russia has under IMF guidance, and with $20 billion of 
IMF loans.129 
Stiglitz has criticized the wests best and brightest that ended up relying on what 
he calls simple textbook models or naïve ideology.  It is not so much that Russians 
always react differently to incentives; but that the ill formed market infrastructure within 
which those incentives operate is all but guaranteed to produce differing results. 
During this period, the wages of these socio-economic groups continuously 
decreased in real terms. Hence, maintaining political support from these groups and 
simultaneously implementing economic reforms became increasingly difficult for the 
government. In order to tackle this problem and prevail in political competition, the 
government began to stray from the proposed reform program by the IMF and began to 
pursue populist economic policies. The government sought to find new ways to build 
public support, therefore, started to shift its investments from manufacturing to 
infrastructure.  On the other hand, with these populist economic policies, the government 
compromised fiscal discipline and failed to implement necessary economic measures to 
control and cut the fiscal deficit on a permanent basis. 
 
C. ECONOMIC POLICIES  
This section covers the government’s economic policies prior to the crisis.  From 
the beginning of the transition to capitalism the Russian government designed its 
monetary, export, and import policies to improve Russia’s foreign trade, but heavily 
relied on oil exports. The government initially aimed at increasing foreign exchange 
reserves by improving the profitability of the tradable goods sector, and hence 
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implemented trade policies accordingly. The government launched export promotion 
measures, such as export subsidies and exchange rate measures to promote exports and 
eliminate foreign exchange constraints on the tradable goods sector.  
IMF should have weaned Russia of its dependence on oil. Equally important was 
the sharp drop in oil and other raw material prices during 1998. This caused the value of 
Russia's oil exports, its main source of foreign currency earnings, to fall by almost half in 
the first six months of 1998 compared to the same period of 1997.130 
 
Figure 6.   Russian Oil Prices 1995-2001 
From: http://www.resbank.co.za/economics/qbul1298/pdf/review.pdf (May 13, 2003). 
Together, these two developments led investors to begin removing their funds from 
Russia.  
Russia suddenly began slipping into a classic debt trap. Although the 
government's deficit was running at only a moderately high rate of 5 percent of GDP, by 
early summer the growing flight of capital out of the country forced the government to 
pay rapidly escalating interest rates on the money it borrowed to finance the deficit.  
                                                 




Figure 7.   Total Russian Government Debt  
From: http://www.resbank.co.za/economics/qbul1298/pdf/review.pdfb (May 13, 2003). 
To make matters worse, Russia mainly sold very short term bonds, some coming 
due in a matter of weeks after issue, which only deepened its repayment problem. By 
July, Russia's monthly interest payments exceeded its monthly tax revenues by 40 
percent. Realizing this was unsustainable, investors began a stampede for the door despite 
the IMF's huge bailout loan.131  
 
D. PRIVATIZATION 
One of the major problems for the Russian government was implementing the 
IMF directed privatization of government owned industries.  This was a major change for 
Russians.  The IMF though, in their proposal failed to recognize the differences in 
culture, history, and previous economic and political evolution. The History and ways of 
the Russians conducted business were not compatible with free market principles and 
required more than just selling government assets to ensure success of privatization.  The 
IMF assumed that because free market principles work in the United States or the United 
Kingdom that the same would hold true in Russia. This is a big assumption for a country 
that was subjected to forty-five or seventy years of communism. Given the differences, 
the results were bound to be very different. To be successful, the adoption of foreign 
experiments and legal codes must be designed so that those affected find it in their self-
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interest to support such rules. In this way, the new owners become self-enforcers. It is 
rare that far-reaching measures of this sort become successful if the rules of the game are 
imposed only from the top down. The trick, then, is to design a system that will generate 
self-interest.132  
To accomplish a successful privatization, Russia needed to take steps to build 
business and legal infrastructure by encouraging new business start-ups and the 
privatization of small state business entities. Only when a competitive infrastructure has 
been established should an effort be made to privatize larger state enterprises or 
monopolies, which went against IMF policies. The IMF failed to recognize that by 
privatizing state monopolies usually results with a private monopoly that operates little 
differently from its antecedent.  This is due to the comfort factor.  It is what the owners 
know and workers react to.  Because of this, many of the privatized enterprises in Russia 
did not change but rather conducted business the same as they did in the Soviet era and 
disregard the operating customs necessary for a market economy to blossom. That is why 
it is so essential to concentrate on the creation of a competitive market infrastructure with 
a multitude of players who will support and maybe even enforce the rules of the game 
that are considered to be the hallmark of a market economy.  
Another oversight of the IMF was the Russian peoples ingenuity.  When the 
government began to privatize, many directors refused to buy the companies.  Instead 
they waited until they went bankrupt or in default to and they could end up as the de facto 
owners of their factories and then proceed to strip the assets as they pleased. So the 
privatization process was side stepped and resulted in many of the businesses failing or 
operating inefficiently for the benefit of the directors.    
Meanwhile, privatization has concentrated wealth in a few hands. According to 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, director of the Harvard Institute for International Development and a 
former adviser to the Russian government, the reason for such new loans is to “insure that 
the earlier loans are repaid and that the ruble keeps its value long enough for speculators 
to get their money out without large losses.”133 Indeed, interest rates that recently reached 
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150 percent will almost certainly be paid out of funds currently earmarked for retired 
pensioners and unpaid workers.134  
The IMF also insisted that, to combat inflation, Russia must pursue a tight fiscal 
and monetary policy - that is, make sharp cuts in public spending and keep money and 
credit scarce. This assured that plunging demand for goods and services would bring on a 
major depression. Eventually the Russian government found it could meet the mandatory 
IMF spending reduction targets only by increasing delays in paying workers and 
suppliers. Unpaid suppliers could not pay their own workers, spreading a chain of unpaid 
wages and taxes through the economy. 
They could not agree on their privatization strategy. As a consequence, they 
delayed the privatization of most of their larger enterprises until about 1995. However, 
they wisely moved ahead with their plan to facilitate the start-up of new businesses, 
supplemented with the privatization of small state shops and services.  
Factories must be not only privatized but also restructured so that they are better 
able to compete, not only in Poland but also externally. The public at large, not just the 
factory managers and workforce, should benefit from both the process of privatization 
and the subsequent and ongoing operation of these enterprises.  
 
E. TAX POLICY 
Another reform necessary for successful transition was the restructuring of the tax 
system.  Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government under 
Yeltsin set out to reform the tax policies to overcome the increasing government deficit.  
In the past, when a new tax regulation loaded a new tax burden on a certain socio-
economic group, depending on the extent of the reaction from this group, the government 
usually amended the tax law or somewhat alleviated the tax burden through exemptions, 
exceptions, and postponement of the tax payments.  In this context, political conjuncture 
significantly affected the feasibility of the government’s tax policies. 
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Figure 8.   Central Government Real Revenues 1995-2001 
From: Rautava, Jouko. “The Role of Oil Prices and the Real Exchange Rate in 
Russa’s Economy” Bank of Finland: Institiute for Economies in Transition 
(BOFIT). BOFIT  Discussion Paper No. 3, 2002.  
http://www.bof.fi/bofit/fin/6dp/abs/pdf/dp0302.pdf (May 2, 2003). 
 
The government’s tax revenues had been declining for several years prior to the 
demise of the Soviet Union.  This was mainly a result of the government’s inappropriate 
tax policies. This became a significant issue with the attempts at economic transformation 
due to lack of funding to operate the new government. The inefficiencies and corruption 
mainly lay in the personal income tax, which constituted a major portion of the total tax 
revenues of the government’s consolidated budget.135 The government collected the 
income tax according to the rates it determined for each income bracket; however, the 
government did not increase the nominal income bracket limit at the same rate as the 
inflation rate. As a result, lower income groups, particularly the government employees 
who paid payroll taxes, sustained high tax rates.136   
A bigger problem was the lack of salaries being paid to employees, which meant 
there was nothing to tax.  The majority of people in Russia including government and 
military went months without a paycheck.  No paycheck, no taxes, which hindered tax 
reform.  Other problems as discussed in earlier chapters including corruption and 
inefficiency also played crucial roles. 
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The IMF mandated tax reform and collection criticizing the Russian government 
on its failure to collect taxes and correct corruption in the tax system.137  But did Russia 
have the opportunity to do this under the tight restrictions of conditionality.138  
Specifically the IMF wanted cuts in government spending, higher taxes, and tighter 
credit. According to Stiglitz, for a country suffering from a 50 percent decline in 
production, this is absurd advice. The problem again came back to the fact that no was 
being paid so no taxes were being collected.  The only way to help was through 
government spending to stimulate the economy, but this was against IMF policy.139 Any 
economics textbook notes that such measures, by further reducing the demand for goods 
and services, will only make an already severe recession worse.  
Take, for instance, the tax collection crackdown the IMF is urging. The Russian 
government, under pressure to increase the amount of cash in the budget, is demanding 
that enterprises settle their tax debts in cash, not in kind. One's gain is the other's loss. If 
taxes are paid, wages would not be.140  That is what has happened at regular intervals in 
recent years. The government's efforts to raise taxes from industrial enterprises and 
individuals to pay public sector workers were only worsening the problem of private 
sector wage arrears. 
Most urgently many enterprises must sell their products for cash in order to pay 
wages. This explains the ironic feature of the virtual economy that while it is itself a 
nonmarket system, it depends upon the market. In fact, many Russian exports lose 
money. But for participants in the virtual economy, the goal of exporting is not profit, but 
cash. The losses they incur are considered a necessary cost of staying in business. Finally, 
the minimal amount of cash in this system does not mean cash is irrelevant in Russia. On 
the contrary, in the land of the cashless, the man with pocket change is king, or at least an 
oligarch, as Russian capitalists and financiers are called. Some Russian capitalists 
                                                 
137“ Russia Restores ties with IMF,” BBC News, June 19, 2001. 
138 “Russia Restores Ties with IMF,” BBC News, June 19, 2001. 
139 Joseph Stiglitz, “What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis,” The Insider (April 6, 2000). 
140 William Easterly, “The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty,” World Bank (November 
2000). 
49 
certainly have more than pocket change, but in international terms they are not 
particularly wealthy.  
In conclusion, the government’s tax policies prior to 1998 were partially due to 
IMF constraints however the corruption and limitations of the Russian tax structure 
played a key role at not being able to establish an effective tax collection system nor 
increase the public revenue. The government gave up some of its tax revenues either to 
improve the financial sector or to support a certain economic activity. On the other hand, 
occasional remittances of the interests on tax debts and lack of supervision of the income 
earner’s accounts, excluding the payroll taxpayers, degraded tax morality and obstructed 
the government’s attempts to broaden the tax base.141 
 
F. EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT’S ECONOMIC POLICIES  
This section evaluates the relationship of the government’s economic policies on 
the 1998 economic crisis and tries to demonstrate that the changes the government 
attempted prior to 1998 had significant influence on the crisis. As discussed in the 
previous sections, both the transformation of the Russian political arena, IMF polices and 
global economic problems created a suitable environment for an economic crisis. On the 
other hand neither the political factors nor the unfavorable economic situation caused an 
economic crisis. The events that ultimately started the crisis began with the government 
change in 1993 after the ratification of the new Russian Constitution. 
Following the ratification, the new regime put all resources towards restoring the 
economy and basic standards of living.  The government became heavily reliant on the 
central bank, foreign investment, and IMF for support.  As this became more apparent, 
many investors began to loose faith in the strength of recovery and pulled out caused 
deterioration in the ability of the government to continue with economic reforms.  The 
IMF rushed a relief package but was of little help. 
The Russian’s decided upon the IMF “shock therapy” type of program. But 
disregarding warnings from some veteran Sovietologists, the reformers, as noted earlier, 
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refused to acknowledge that Russia was a special case. It was inconceivable to them that 
an economy could exist without an underlying market infrastructure. Just as when “shock 
therapy” reform was introduced in developing countries, the reformers in Russia assumed 
that all it would take would be a dose of fresh economic air to turn what was a 
dysfunctional economy in extension into a functioning one. With a freely functioning 
price system, prices would rise, queues would shrink, profits would rise, and output 
would increase. Almost immediately, new businesses would open their doors and a viable 
market infrastructure would take form. None of this happened, and actually the opposite 
took place. 
Factory managers suddenly found themselves without a guide as to where to find 
inputs and how much to pay for them and, similarly, what to do with their outputs and 
how much to charge for them. At the same time, while government officials had been 
divested of their former responsibilities and obligations, they were as yet unfamiliar with 
the new powers normally operative in market economies. To make matters worse, Russia 
at the time was caught in a hyperinflationary environment, as evidenced by the twenty-
six-fold price increase that occurred in 1992.142  The result was people needed to find 
ways to supplement their income to survive, so many resorted to corruption and 
extortion.143  The corruption seeped into all aspects of Russian life and politics including 
the tax system. The money otherwise destined for the government is diverted instead to 
the tax collectors' pockets as discussed earlier.144   The corruption and lack of confidence 
had a huge impact on the transformation process and the ability to successfully operate 
under a market system.  Due to a lack of good advice and guidance, Russia transformed 
into a hybrid of economic systems full of corruption and problems. 
The IMF with assistance from the United States attempted to restructure the 
failing Russian economy but found that retrofitting is always more difficult than doing 
something properly the first time around.  The biggest obstacles that were encountered by 
the IMF were the people, who lost faith in the government and its ability to successfully 
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transition to a market system.  Another difficulty was the few oligarchs who have 
benefited so enormously have acquired a vested interest in the status quo, whether it is 
good or bad for the country as a whole.  
The reforms proposed in Russia would only be successful with public pressure 
and the business community, not only for a set of more equitable laws but also for the 
enforcement of those laws.  This would be the only way of weakening the oligarchs and 
monopolists that were plaguing the Russian attempts at transformation. Moreover, a 
larger number of business men and women is likely to mean that there will be more 
effective lobbying groups, interested and determined to set restraints on the bureaucrats' 
ability to abuse the property rights of others.  
On May 2, 1992, Moscow’s Mayor, Yuri Luzkov, undermined Boris Yeltsin’s 
attempts at a successful transition by decreeing that anyone anywhere could sell whatever 
they wanted to.14 This single act destroyed what might have been the best chance Russia 
had to build up the marketing infrastructure that it lacked. In that four-month period, 
Russians from across the country flocked to major intersections and metro stops to sell 
whatever they could assemble. Many were selling out of desperation,  
Eliminating bureaucratic obstructions and corruption is one part of the process 
Russia needed to address. Once the doors were opened, attempts needed to be made to 
facilitate start-ups by offering readily available loans, something that Russian banks 
tended to avoid due to lack of funding or confidence. A study by the Russian Duma 
Committee on Privatization has reported that, from 1992 to 1996, the government 
collected only $20 billion from the sale of about 70 percent of what had been the nation's 
state enterprises. According to their study, “too much was sold off, and often at the wrong 
time,” under a set of laws that “covered only about 15 percent of the legal issues 
involved.”145 
Owners should be compensated or given the right of first refusal to make up the 
difference between the  market  value  at  the  time  and  what  they  actually paid. Those 
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businesses acquired as part of the Loan for Shares program, in which valuable properties 
were sold at one-tenth their value to oligarch insiders in rigged auctions, should be made 
special targets.  
 
G. CRISIS EVENT AND GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE  
One of the Russian government’s initial objectives after the fall of the Soviet 
Union was attempting to control the high rate of inflation through a series of economic 
stabilization programs. The programs included opening the economy to free markets, 
increasing interest rates and cutting money production. The disinflation programs of the 
1990s, however, failed to achieve their objective of decreasing high inflation rates.  The 
IMF identified the lack of structural reform as contributing to the continued fiscal 
pressures, which in turn, undermined attempts to achieve and maintain macroeconomic 
stability.146 The World Bank and the IMF particularly emphasized the fiscal 
commitments to the SEEs, agricultural subsidies, social security obligations, and 
financial sector bailouts as the major causes of fiscal expansion, which undermined 
attempts to stabilize prices. 
The goal of Russia’s 1995 IMF backed stabilization program was aimed at 
resolving many of the problems the IMF felt were slowing Russia’s economic 
transformation.  This stabilization program aimed at improving Russia’s fiscal balance 
and reducing the long- lasting price inflation.  The main tenets of the program were 
tighter fiscal policy and structural reform. 
Despite the stabilization programs by the IMF, the main problems of the Russian 
economy remained the same. The success of a stabilization program depends on the 
consistency of the overall package of the measures and perceived ability of the authorities 
to pursue these policies successfully.147 During the period between 1991 and 1998, the 
Russian government failed to follow this consistency principle, mostly due to political 
factors. As the political competition in the Russian political environment increased after 
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the 1993 ratification of the new constitution, the government began to compromise with 
the 1995 stabilization program and pursued expansionist economic policies to increase its 
support for the new government and constitution.  
This situation, however, significantly affected the government’s ability to 
implement essential fiscal measures to stabilize the Russian economy. Consequently, 
although tight monetary and fiscal measures were supposed to be implemented after the 
1993, the government failed to achieve neither of these successfully. The main problems 
of the Russian economy, such as the increasing public deficit and high inflation rate, 
remained unresolved and these problems finally led to the economic crisis in 1998.148 
With these attempted improvements in the economy, the stabilization programs 
were short-lived and balances began to worsen towards the end of 1994 due to shifts in 
political power and global events including the war in Chechnya.  The result was the 
crash of the ruble and the beginning of the road to the 1998 economic crisis.  The reasons 
that contributed to the collapse of the stabilization program will be discussed in detail in 
the following section.  
 
H.  INITIAL CRISIS EVENT AND GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
1.  Immediate Impact of 1992 Ruble Devaluation 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 significantly affected the Russian economy; 
in the aftermath of the crisis, the Russian economy recorded the highest decrease in 
output in the history of the Russian Republic. The economy contracted by approximately 
6 percent. The Russian Ruble substantially depreciated against major foreign currencies 
between January and April 1992; the Russian Ruble depreciated by almost 70 percent 
against the United States Dollar and real prices skyrocketed.149 The high depreciation 
ratio of the Russian Ruble significantly contributed to the output loss in the Russian 
economy by causing bankruptcies among businesses. Businesses that had foreign-
currency denominated loans could not afford their payments and went bankrupt, causing 
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a drastic decrease in national output and increasing unemployment.150 Rising prices 
resulted in a sharp decrease in both real wages and household income. Banks did not 
want to extend their lending in such an uncertain environment and increased their lending 
rates by approximately 400 percent between January and April 1994. The volatile 
economic situation, coupled with rising lending rates, significantly affected private 
consumption and investment, both of which declined during the crisis period.151  The 
IMF’s response, however, came quite late when considering that the crisis event began to 
unfold years earlier.  
 
2. Government’s Response to Conditionality 
Economic stabilization programs are usually implemented in developing countries 
facing high inflation, high external debt, unsustainable public-sector budget deficits, and 
balance of payments crisis. The fundamental objective of a stabilization program is to 
balance aggregate supply and demand in the economy. Timing is a crucial factor for 
achieving the projected goals of a stabilization program, regardless of which type of 
program is implemented. In the case of an economic crisis, the sooner the government 
launches a stabilization program, the more successful the stabilization program will be to 
alleviate the impacts of the economic crisis.152 
When examining the economic crisis in Russia, the government was late in 
responding to the crisis with an effective stabilization program. The crisis’ roots can be 
traced to 1992 as discussed earlier, but the government postponed any major stabilization 
effort until after local elections and the ratification of the constitution.  The concern by 
many Russian leaders was that any stabilization effort before the local elections would 
endanger voter support for the coalition parties that formed the government.  Immediately 
following the elections, the government under Boris Yeltsin announced the stabilization 
package.  The government set out to decrease the high inflation rate, stabilize the Russian 
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Ruble, and attempted to restore economic stability in the short-run and implement 
structural reforms to maintain economic stability in the long run. 
The government’s failure to fully implement the stabilization programs, including 
privatization, tax reform and reduction of corruption greatly contributed to its failure. The 
government as a result was unable to raise the revenue it expected due to a lack of 
maintaining the tight fiscal policy it adopted in the initial stage of the stabilization 
program and relaxed its fiscal policy over time. As a result, despite the initial increase in 
the consolidated budget revenues and the decrease in the current expenditures, the 
government failed to keep the consolidated budget deficit within the IMF performance 
criteria with the deficit substantially increasing towards the end of 1994.153  
In August 1998, the Asian financial crisis hit the Russian economy and 
aggravated the already adverse macroeconomic conditions in the Russian economy. In 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, fiscal and current account deficits, the inflation 
rate, and unemployment rates significantly increased. These developments forced the 
government to sign a new stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1999. The government, 
however, could not effectively implement the measures of the IMF agreement and the 
Russian economy experienced the economic crisis. 
The volatility in the financial markets stabilized temporarily after the IMF 
announced the availability $10 billion financial assistance to the government. The IMF 
conditioned the financial assistance on the government’s commitment to strengthen the 
financial sector, accelerate privatization, and to strengthen the budget to accommodate 
the fiscal costs of bank recapitalization. 
Before the economic crises, the government delayed necessary structural reforms 
and executed inappropriate economic policies, which distorted the government’s fiscal 
situation. In 1997, the government changed its debt financing methods and began to rely 
heavily on the Central Bank’s resources to finance the public deficit. In addition, the 
government delayed implementing disciplinary fiscal measures until after the crisis 
happened. The government did not implement necessary banking regulations to 
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restructure the banking system in order to establish a strong financial system. Russian 
banks remained highly vulnerable to shifts in the government’s economic policy. 
Excessive foreign borrowing of the banks increased their vulnerability to unexpected 
increases in the interest rates. As a result, the inadequate risk management coupled with 
poor banking system regulation and moral hazard caused by government guarantees 
prevented the establishment of a strong financial system in Russia which, in turn, 
catalyzed the emergence of both 1992 ruble depreciation and 1998 economic crisis.154 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the government’s economic policies significantly contributed to the 
1998 economic crisis. This does not mean that deterioration in macroeconomic 
fundamentals did not contribute to the crisis. On the contrary, the deteriorating fiscal 
situation created a volatile economic environment prone to speculations. As a matter of 
fact, the government’s economic policies in the second half of 1993, canceling domestic 
debt auctions and relying on the Central Bank’s resources, were some of the main factors 
that started the crisis. In the absence of substantial stabilization measures, the government 
should have continued domestic debt financing despite its high cost, rather than relying 
on the Central Bank’s resources. This would allow the government to maintain foreign 
exchange reserves, contain the inflation rate, and gain valuable time to design and 
implement radical stabilization measures to improve its fiscal situation. 
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V. THESIS CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, there have been extensive debates as to the effectiveness of 
IMF assistance in transitional economies.  This thesis took this debate and focused it with 
respect to Russia and the IMF’s impact on the 1998 Russian economic crisis. 
The Russian economic crisis illustrated a combined misunderstanding by both the 
IMF and Russia as to the nature of the problem and the correct way to solve it.  The result 
was the 1998 crisis. The crisis began long before the IMF and Russia began to collaborate 
on the transition of Russia.  The blame can be placed on both sides but the burden lies 
more on the Russian side.  The lack of addressing the corruption, inefficiencies, and the 
stagnant economy threatened the possibilities of a strong economy long before the IMF 
became involved.  The legacy of the decisions made in the pre transition period 
influenced the policy choices of the Russian Government prior to and during the 1998 
crisis. 
Davies and Woods proposed three possible positions as to the cause of the crisis 
that were discussed in chapter III: The first position suggested is one of “we lost Russia” 
or that the West was responsible for the failure of Russia due to lack of assistance.  The 
second view, and probably one of the most accepted outside the IMF, is that outside 
pressures forced the Russian government to adopt measures ill-suited to the conditions of 
the country.  The last position is that Russia brought about its own demise and that 
outside intervention did not help and could not have prevented the crisis.  The evidence 
presented in this demonstrates that Fund sanctions can be costly. This is somewhat 
surprising, since the conventional wisdom is that states can return to the Fund with their 
past sins of program noncompliance forgiven and receive fresh loans.  
This evidence stands in contrast to our conventional understanding suggests that 
Fund sanctions are costly to the extent that they deter additional flows of loans and 
investments into a country. While these countries made mistakes, their economies were 
undermined by the impact of the global market and capital flows that the IMF sought to 
set free. 
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Chapter II showed the Russian government’s policies were not the sole cause of 
the crisis.  The IMF played a role by their failure to address the root causes of Russia’s 
difficulties.  Without an accurate understanding of Russian culture and a complete grasp 
of their problems, the IMF prescribed inappropriate measures to the Russian government.  
The IMF made two crucial mistakes in Russia.  The first was their lack of understanding 
as to the true nature of Russia’s problems.  They assumed they could take a pre-existing 
model and apply it to Russia and instantly create a capitalist economy.  This was a major 
oversight.  The second mistake was the failure to ensure stabilization programs were 
actually being implemented.  By not ensuring progress, the IMF permitted Russia to 
adopt destructive policies resulting in much of the debt, corruption and general distrust 
experienced.  The arguments by Stiglitz, Sanders and others stated: the worst mistake 
Russia made was accepting IMF assistance. 
As the economy continued to decline, greater political discontent and 
fractionalization within and outside of the Soviet government occurred. One of the 
biggest factors to the fall of the Russian economy came from within.  Mikhail Gorbachev 
came into power with ideas of transforming Russia back into a great power. Gorbachev's 
primary miscalculation was his quick transformation of the centralized economy. The 
transformation began without having the market system to replace it.   
After decades of communism, the people and the government were not prepared 
for the transition of their government and economy.  Lack of knowledge as to the ways of 
capitalism and the need to adjust to new structure of government and living, greatly 
hindered the transition and success. The economy in the Soviet Union, hobbled by 
corruption, inefficiency, and the lack of free markets, finally collapsed June 1990.  With 
the collapse of both the political and economic systems, the Soviet Union merely ceased 
to be and in its place arose Russia and the other newly independent states.  Massive 
demonstrations in Moscow in August 1991 over an attempted coup by hardliners were 
witness to the demise of the Soviet Union. 
The government’s economic policies significantly contributed to the 1998 
economic crisis. Upon completion of this thesis, several factors were brought to light in 
the wake of the crisis.  On the Russian behalf, the contributing causes were a result of 
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attempts to transform their culture without a clear direction on how to complete the 
transition successfully.  As a result, ad hoc transformation resulted in large deficits, 
corruption and failure.  With the introduction of IMF assistance, the Russian government 
continued to pursue policies detrimental to successful transformation.  The government 
failed to meet self-imposed or IMF mandated reform policies.  As Russia continued to 
fall apart, the government continued to ignore the underlying problems causing the crisis.  
This does not mean that deterioration in the world economy or the IMF did not contribute 
to the crisis. On the contrary, in the absence of substantial stabilization measures, the 
government should have continued domestic debt financing despite its high cost, rather 
than relying on the Central Bank’s resources. This would have allowed the government to 
maintain foreign exchange reserves, contain the inflation rate, and gain valuable time to 
design and implement radical stabilization measures to improve its fiscal situation. 
This thesis found considerable problems with the Russian transition to a capitalist 
economy.  The research in this thesis present many factors that played a role in creating 
the 1998 Russian economic crisis.  In the end the blame for the crisis was not the 
economic or political liberalization of Russia, nor the world economic environment, or 
IMF policies, or lack of understanding; it was a combination of all these factors.   
The combination of both Russia and the IMF’s misunderstanding and lack of 
cooperation created an environment, which made the crisis inevitable. It is 
acknowledged, as addressed in this thesis, that world factors may have had a part, but 
these only worsened an already volatile situation.  So in conclusion the cause of the 1998 
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